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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
and assigns, their interest in the fixtures. Since the mortgagor and mort-
gagee may, as between themselves, treat the property as either real or per-
sonal in its nature, there appears to be no serious objection to recording the
transaction as involving an interest in land, with a view to furnishing con-
structive notice to subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of the premises.
Recording the chattel mortgage at the same time is justified as a protec-
tion and notice to possible vendees of the chattel mortgagor who might
wrongfully sever the fixtures and attempt to sell them.
It is interesting to note the Personal Property Laws of New York (Ca-
hill, 1923) c. 4, art. 4, secs. 65, 66, 67, and their classification of chattels
into three classes: first, chattels, which because of their character, remain
personal property after annexation to the real estate, even without an
agreement between the parties to that effect (and interpreted to include re-
frigerators or their units) ; second, chattels, which because of their char-
acter, inherently become a part of the realty (such as bricks, concrete piers,
etc.) ; and third, chattels, which, after annexation, continue to be personal
property or realty according to the agreement between the immediate par-
ties. See Chasnow v. Marlane Holding Co. (1930) 137 Misc. 332, 244 N. Y.
455. L. S., '33.
INSURANCE-INCONTESTABLE CLAUSE-RIGHT IN EQUITY TO CANCELLA-
TION FOR FRAUD AFTER INSURED'S DEATH WITHIN PERID.-After the death
of the insured, the insurance company brought a bill in equity against the
beneficiary to cancel the life insurance policy because of fraudulent misrep-
resentations made by the deceased. Held, such a suit is proper if the policy
contains a clause making it incontestable after a certain period from date
except for non-payment of premiums; but the bill must be filed within that
period and must allege that no suit at law had been instituted by the bene-
ficiary, so that the company had not been able to use this fraud as a defense
at law. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel (Mo. 1931) 42 S. W. (2d) 584. This
case is in accord with an earlier case before the St. Louis Court of Appeals,
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cobb (1926) 219 Mo. App. 609, 282 S. W. 494;
but the present case was certified to the Missouri Supreme Court because of
the alleged conflict between the latter case and the sweeping dicta against
suits in equity to cancel insurance policies after the death of the insured
which were contained in many earlier Missouri cases, based upon a statute
which seems mandatory in its demand that the issue whether the misrepre-
sentation was material or not should be left to the jury. R. S. Mo. (1929)
sec. 5732; Schuerman v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1901) 165 Mo. 641, 65
S. W. 723; State ex rel. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen et al.
(1926) 313 Mo. 384, 282 S. W. 46. The Supreme Court explained away this
conflict by showing that in none of the previous cases had there been an
incontestable clause and that if the insured could not bring such a suit in
equity, the beneficiary might deprive the former of a valid defense by de-
laying suit until the period of contestability had passed. Thus, the present
suit was likened to a bill quia timet, while the former attempts to sue in
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equity were based upon the old, but now discarded, theory of concurrent
jurisdiction over fraud cases. It is interesting to note that the present
case has already been followed by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in a suit
the decision of which was delayed until this ruling was made. Mississippi
Valley Life Ins. Co. v. Riddle (Mo. App. 1931) 43 S. W. (2d) 1059.
The validity of such an incontestable clause is universally recognized,
although the various states differ as to the theory upon which its sanction
should rest and also as to the meaning of the clause. In an earlier case,
the Missouri Supreme Court took the view that the insurance company by
putting the clause in a policy which it sold was estopped from attacking its
validity, for the insured paid the premiums so as to give the beneficiaries
after a certain period an absolute contractual claim. Harris v. Security
Life Ins. Co. (1913) 248 Mo. 304, 154 S. W. 68. The more prevalent view
is that the clause creates a special short period of limitation upon certain
defenses. Powell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1925) 313 III. 161, 144 N. E. 825;
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Horni Packing Co. (1923) 263 U. S. 167. The
courts are willing to use this theory even though a statute makes void any
agreement imposing a period of limitation shorter than that set by the
Statute of Limitations, merely treating the former statute as inapplicable
as directed only against agreements contrary to public policy, while the in-
contestable clause is considered to be in accord with public policy. Priest v.
Kansas City Life Ins. Co. (1925) 119 Kan. 23, 237 Pac. 938. Other courts
have upheld the clause on the basis that the insurer might have agreed to
make the policy absolute from the beginning, while the clause as an excep-
tion to this gives him a limited right of contest. Citizens Life Ins. Co. v.
McClure (1910) 138 Ky. 138, 127 S. W. 749; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Pickering (C. C. A. 5, 1923) 293 F. 496, certiorari denied (1923) 263
U. S. 720. This argument can be met by the view advanced by other courts
that such an absolute waiver of fraud would be void as contrary to public
policy. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hardison (1908) 199 Mass. 190, 85 N. E.
410; Welch v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (1899) 108 Iowa 224, 78 N. W.
853. Although the usual clause makes the incontestability arise after a cer-
tain period from the date of the policy without any further stipulation, a
few courts have held that the death of the insured automatically stops the
running of this period, fixing the rights of the parties as they were at that
time. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Smith (1923) 157 Ark. 499, 248
S. W. 897; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Stevens (1923) 157 Minn. 253, 195 N. W.
913. As is pointed out in the principal case this is contrary to the great
weight of authority, with which Missouri is in accord. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Hurni Packing Co., supra; Killian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1929)
251 N. Y. 44, 166 N. E. 798. Although the minority view is perhaps more
convenient in that it obviates the need for a suit in equity, it does great
violence to the language used in the policy.
It is well settled that it is not enough for the insurer to raise the question
of fraud in letters to the beneficiary within the period. The beneficiary is
entitled to have the question determined in a court. Powell v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., supra; Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Cranford (1923) 161 Ark.
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602, 257 S. W. 66. The principal case and the Cobb case recognize this doc-
trine in its most absolute form, but in applying Illinois law to an Illinois
policy, the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that it was enough if the insur-
ance company had raised the point and taken a release from the bene-
ficiaries, although the release was later held to be invalid. Eichwedel V.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1925) 216 Mo. App. 452, 270 S. W. 415. Under
this view, if the beneficiary does not file a suit so that an answer may raise
the point within the period, the insurer must sue in equity for cancellation
or the defense is lost. This seems bad public policy in that it encourages
suits. The mere fact that suit on the policy is filed in the period is not
enough; the answer raising the point must also be filed in that time. Mis-
souri State Life Ins. Co. v. Cranford, supra. The principal case intimates
that equity is barred if the lawsuit was withdrawn after the insurer had
had a reasonable time in which to answer, even though the full period al-
lowed by the statute for the filing of the answer had not passed. This is
just.
In a suit in equity the beneficiary loses the advantage of a jury trial
upon the issues of the fact and materiality of the fraud, a point of consider-
able importance because of the notorious prejudice of juries against insur-
ance companies. However, it has been pointed out that this loss is caused
by the beneficiary's own remissness in not filing suit sooner so that the point
could be raised by answer. Keystone Dairy Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co.
(C. C. A. 3, 1927) 19 F. (2d) 68. If in the bill for cancellation, the bene-
ficiary counterclaims for the amount of the policy, it has been held under
the Washington Code that this counterclaim must be tried by a jury.
Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Walker (1923) 123 Wash. 203, 212 Pac. 277;
contra, Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Fillat (1926) 127 Misc. 68, 215 N. Y. S.
277 (under the new New York Civil Practice Act). In the Federal courts a
subsequent suit at law will be restrained unless the insurer actually defends
the latter. New York Life Ins. Co. v. McCarthy (C. C. A. 5, 1927) 22 F.
(2d) 241; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Seymour (C. C. A. 6, 1930) 45 F. (2d)
47. It would seem that the Missouri law would be in a better position to
give the most ample protection to the rights of all parties, if it would add to
the doctrines laid down in the principal case the view expressed by the
Washington Court. Then, the beneficiary could always obtain a jury trial
if he desired it. G. W. S., '33.
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